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Abstract 
The reform of the cash-based welfare program for single mothers in the US which 
occurred in the 1990s was the most important since its inception in 1935. The reforms 
imposed credible and enforceable work requirements into the program for the first time, 
as well as establishing time limits on lifetime receipt. Research on the effects of the 
reform have shown it to have reduced the program caseload and governmental 
expenditures on the program. In addition, the reform has had generally positive average 
effects on employment, earnings, and income, and generally negative effects on poverty 
rates, although the gains are not evenly distributed across groups. A fraction of the 
affected group appears to have been made worse off by the reform. 
Keywords: Welfare reform, Poverty, Single mothers 
JEL-codes: I3 
                                                 
° The author would like to thank Rebecca Blank, Matz Dahlberg, Jeffrey Grogger, Eva Mörk, Knut Røed, an 
anonymous referee, and the participants at the conference for comments. Reprinted with permission from Swedish 
Economic Policy Review. 
* Robert Moffitt is Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University. 
IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience  1 Table of contents 
1  Context: The US system of means-tested transfers.............................................3 
2  The AFDC program and the 1996 welfare reform..............................................6 
2.1  Early reforms.......................................................................................................6 
2.2  The 1990s and TANF........................................................................................10 
3  Effects of the reform..........................................................................................15 
3.1  Four types of studies..........................................................................................15 
3.2  Findings on the overall effect of reform............................................................17 
3.3  Findings on effect of components.....................................................................27 
4  Remaining and future issues in the US .............................................................31 
References .......................................................................................................................35 
Comment by Knut Røed..................................................................................................40 
References .......................................................................................................................46 
 
2  IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience The most well-known transfer program for the poor in the United States is that which 
provides low-income families with children, mostly headed by a single mother, with 
cash support. Denoted by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program prior to 1996 and by the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) 
program thereafter, it underwent a major structural reform in that year. This 
unprecedented reform imposed credible and enforceable work requirements for the first 
time in the history of the program, requirements which were extended to a large fraction 
of the caseload and were enforced by the use of sanctions that reduced or eliminated 
benefits for noncompliance. The reform also imposed lifetime time limits on the receipt 
of benefits.  
Following the reform, the caseload in the program fell dramatically and several other 
indices changed as well: employment rates of single mothers rose, as did average 
earnings and family income among the single mother population. Poverty rates of single 
mothers fell. The often dire warnings of large-scale deprivation which were made at the 
time of the reform did not materialize, although there is some evidence that a small 
fraction of the single mother population was made worse off by the reform. 
This paper will review the US experience and assess the causes and effects of the 
1996 reform. The first section of the paper puts the AFDC-TANF program in 
perspective relative to the larger US system of transfers to the poor. The second section 
reviews the elements of the 1996 reform and how they altered the program that existed 
previously, and discusses the rationales for the reform. A review of the research 
literature on the effects of the reform is presented in the third section, followed by a 
review of some of the issues currently under discussion in the US on what to do next. 
1  Context: The US system of means-tested 
transfers 
The TANF program is only a small component in the larger system of means-tested 
transfer programs in the US today. Table 1 shows the expenditures and caseloads for the 
nine largest such programs in 2004. The largest by far is the Medicaid program, which 
provides health care to low-income families (it is separate from the Medicare program, 
IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience  3 the social insurance program that provides medical care to the elderly regardless of 
income level). The Medicaid program provides medical care not only to poor families, 
including those single mothers who are on TANF, but also to the poor elderly and the 
disabled, who account for a much larger fraction of program expenditures than single 
mothers. The Supplemental Security Income program, which provides cash benefits to 
the low-income aged, blind, and disabled adults and children, is much smaller but still 
quite sizable in terms of expenditure. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program, 
an earning subsidy program which provides tax credits to families with earnings and 
which is discussed by Meyer (2007) is third largest. The Food Stamp program, which 
provides food coupons to the poor, and programs for subsidized housing for the poor are 
fourth and fifth, respectively. The TANF program is, as the table shows, only the sixth 
largest program in the US in terms of expenditure, and only half as much is spent on it 
as the next largest program. Its caseload is also small, although because it provides a 
cash benefit for all needs and not just a supplemental payment like Food Stamps and the 
EITC, its expenditure per recipient is larger than those of those two programs. 
As will be discussed below, the welfare reforms of the 1990s in the US reduced 
expenditures and caseloads in the AFDC and TANF programs. However, many of the 
other programs listed in Table 1 have grown. Figure 1 shows trends in real total 
expenditure since 1968 in the eighty largest means-tested programs in the US, revealing 
that per-capita expenditure in total is higher today than ever in its history. The spurt in 
real expenditure growth in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the result of growth in 
AFDC, Food Stamp, and Medicaid expenditures, but this was followed by a decade 
(approximately 1978-1988) of flat expenditure growth. However, the period of flat 
growth was followed by an explosion in expenditure that occurred more rapidly – in the 
space of 6 years, from 1990 to 1996 – and which was a result of large increases in 
expenditure on the EITC, SSI, and Medicaid. Expenditure rose again after 2001 as a 
result of growth in the Medicaid and Food Stamp programs. Thus the decline of the 
AFDC-TANF program is not representative of means-tested transfer growth in the 
society as a whole. But it does represent a shift in the groups to whom expenditure is 
directed and in the type of benefits provided. Specifically, expenditure growth has been 
4  IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience directed more toward special groups of individuals (the aged, disabled workers) and 
toward specific needs (food, medical care, and housing) rather than general support. 









Medicaid 300,300  56,100  5,353 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)  39,839  7,139  5,581 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)  34,012
c 19,163
d 1,775 
Food stamps  30,993  24,900  1,245 
Subsidized housing
e 29,844  4,576
f 6,522 
Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) 
14,067 4,746 2,964 
Child care  11,854
g 1,743
h 6,801 
Head start  8,469  906  9,348 
Jobs and training  7,007  1,175
i 6,645
i 
Notes: Federal and state and local spending combined unless otherwise noted. a) Number of individual recipients 
unless otherwise noted; b) Ratio of first column to second column, multiplied by 1000; c) Refundable portion only; d) 
Number of tax units; e) Section 8 and public housing. Federal only; f) Number of dwelling units; g) Child care and 
development block grant (CCDBG) and TANF child care; h) CCDBG only; i) FY 2002. 
Source: Spar (2006, Table 14).  
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Sources: Spar (2006, Tables 3 and 4), US Department of Commerce (2006, Table 2, Population). 
 
It may fairly be asked why the TANF program continues to receive so much 
attention given its current minor status. Several reasons account for this level of 
attention. First, it remains the only general-purpose cash transfer program in the US and 
thus mostly closely fits the public image of “welfare” as well as the policy and 
IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience  5 academic notion of a negative income tax. Second, reforms in the TANF program have 
been the most prominent in reflecting US society’s increasing emphasis on work, and it 
therefore has considerable symbolic value. Third, it is still an important program for a 
particular population group – low-income single mothers who have difficulty working. 
This description of transfer-program receipt in the US shows many differences with 
most countries in Europe. In Europe, food subsidy programs are small if they exist at 
all, and medical care is generally made a part of national health insurance systems. 
Earnings subsidies of the scale of the US EITC have not yet been introduced in Europe 
with the possible exception of the Working Families Tax Credit in the UK. On the other 
hand, many programs in Europe are present in much stronger form than the US. Two of 
the most prominent are those providing unemployment benefits and sick and disability 
pay. In the US, most low-income single mothers do not receive unemployment 
insurance (UI) because a significant employment and earnings history is necessary for 
eligibility, and few single mothers meet the qualifications. The SSI program in the US 
provides some benefits to the disabled, but eligibility requirements are stringent and the 
program does not compare in size to the sickness and disability programs in many 
European countries. Finally, child care subsidies, which are small in the US, are very 
generous in many European countries, including Sweden. 
2  The AFDC program and the 1996 welfare 
reform 
2.1 Early  reforms 
The AFDC program was created by the Social Security Act of 1935 along with the Old-
Age Social Security and Unemployment Insurance programs.
1 AFDC provided cash 
financial support to low-income families with “dependent” children, defined as those 
who were deprived of the support or care of one natural (i.e., biological) parent by 
reason of death, disability, or absence from the home, and who were under the care of 
                                                 
1 A more detailed discussion of the history of the AFDC program can be found in Moffitt (2003), upon which this 
section partly draws. 
6  IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience the other parent or another relative. In practice, the vast majority of such families were 
those with a single mother and her children. In 1935, most such families were widowed, 
and the program was intended to allow mothers to stay at home with their children 
rather than be forced to work. In keeping with the “federal” system in the US, the 
program was created as a shared federal-state responsibility, with the federal 
government subsidizing state payments and setting certain restrictions on eligibility 
requirements and benefit determination, but leaving states with a large degree of latitude 
in both of these areas. One consequence is that different states set very different benefit 
levels, for example. However, most states set a “100 percent” benefit reduction rate – 
benefits were reduced dollar-for-dollar for every extra dollar of earnings, providing little 
or no incentive to work.  
Several reforms occurred in the program prior to the 1990s, as shown in Table 2. In 
1961, two-parent families were made eligible for the program if the primary earner was 
unemployed, at state option. However, asset and income limits for eligibility were not 
adjusted upward and, consequently, few two-parent families have ever been part of the 
program. Financial work incentives were attempted in 1967 when the benefit-reduction 
rate was lowered from 100 percent to 67 percent, an idea popular from the ‘negative 
income tax’ discussions at the time. This reform appeared to have little effect on the 
AFDC caseload, however, which continued to rise after the reform (see below). The 
benefit-reduction rate was increased back to 100 percent in 1981. In 1988, the federal 
government shifted toward a job-search and job-training strategy to increase 
employability and work instead of just using financial incentives. However, neither the 
level of work among recipients nor the caseload itself were much affected by the 1988 
reform as well. 
IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience  7 Table 2 Major legislation in the AFDC and TANF programs 
Date  Title of legislation  Main provisions 
 
1935  Social Security Act  Created the AFDC program for low-income children 
deprived of support of one parent 
 
1961  Amendments to the Social 
Security Act 
 
Created AFDC-UP program for children in two-parent 
families where primary earner is unemployed 
 
1967  Amendments to the Social 
Security Act 
 
Lowered the benefit reduction rate to 2/3; created the 
Work Incentive (WIN) program 
 
1981 Omnibus  Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981 
Increased the benefit reduction rate to 1; imposed a 
gross income limit; counted income of stepparents; 
allowed waiver authority 
 
1988  Family Support Act of 
1988 
Created the JOBS program for education, skills 
training, job search assistance, and other work 
activities; created transitional child care and Medicaid 
programs; mandated AFDC-UP in all states 
 
1996 Personal  Responsibility 
and Work Reconciliation 
Act 




These reforms illustrate the increasing emphasis on work in the program, starting in 
the 1960s and increasing over time. This emphasis has often been ascribed to the 
increasing labor force participation rate of women, which has occurred in other 
countries as well. This change altered the old view that mothers should stay at home 
with their children to a new view that work, even by mothers of young children, was 
natural and even expected. Of course, this emphasis raises many issues concerning its 
possible effects on children themselves as well as adequacy of child care, but the change 
in the views of the public and of policy-makers was unmistakable. 
Another shift revealed by these developments was a change from financial incentives 
to more direct inducements to work. The 1967 reforms failed to have an impact on 
caseloads and expenditures, and financial incentives were rarely considered as a main 
tool thereafter. In fact, however, even the 1967 legislation created a small work program 
which mandated that women whose youngest child was older than six enroll in a work-
related program, usually some type of job placement program. However, the rule was 
rarely enforced and few women were enrolled. In the 1970s, the federal government 
considered other work programs but these never passed Congress. After the 1981 
legislation, however, a number of states began, on their own, experimenting with small-
8  IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience scale work programs, often voluntary, offering job-search, work experience, or basic 
skills training programs to certain categories of recipients. The results of these 
experiments were fairly positive and contributed to the 1988 legislation. However, that 
legislation, which mandated work for many recipients and set “participation” 
requirements for the states, proved to be very difficult to administer. States found the 
creation of the fairly complex jobs programs required by the law to be difficult and, 
moreover, found that the program creation required was fairly expensive. As a result, 
full implementation of the law, which was never achieved, was realized to require much 
larger expenditures on the program than had been anticipated, and was unlikely, at least 
in the short run, to reduce caseloads and expenditures. The 1988 legislation was widely 
regarded as a failure.  
The course of program expenditures and caseloads up to the early 1990s is illustrated 
in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Both expenditures and caseloads rose sharply in the early 
1970s for a variety of reasons, including an increase in take-up among eligibles as 
welfare stigma fell, as well as the superior access to Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits 
for women on AFDC. Thus the 1967 legislation giving increased work incentives did 
not lower the caseload and expenditures, or at least not enough to counteract other 
forces. The 1981 legislation likewise had no discernible impact. Both caseloads and 
expenditures rose sharply in the late 1980s, an event mostly the result of a recession but 
which surely made implementation and the success of the 1988 legislation more 
difficult. Thus, by 1990, policy-makers felt as though a number of reform efforts had 
been attempted over the previous two decades, both financial incentives and more direct 
work programs, with little success in reducing caseloads or expenditures. Nor did the 
evaluation literature indicate that the incomes or employment rates of low-income 
single mothers were much increased by the reforms. 
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2.2  The 1990s and TANF  
Early in the 1990s, in response to this lack of effectiveness of prior reforms, individual 
US states began experimenting with quite different types of reforms. An increased 
emphasis on work requirements was the most important single new element. Education 
and training were generally ruled ineligible to meet the requirements, with an emphasis 
instead on work per se. Government jobs were also generally not provided – the rules 
stipulated that work in a private sector job was necessary. Often an initial period of job 
10  IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience search was allowed but that was then required to be followed by actual work. To 
enforce these requirements, states also began imposing “sanctions” – defined as 
temporary or permanent withdrawal of benefits – on recipients for failure to comply 
with work and other requirements. Although such sanctions had been present in some 
form previously in the AFDC program, they had never been as aggressively enforced.  
Several other features were often introduced into the state reforms: (1) a negative-
income-tax-like reduction of marginal tax rates on earnings to provide financial 
incentives to work; (2) time limits on benefits, stipulating that recipients could not 
receive benefits for more than a certain number of years (2 to 5, for example), at least 
within a given calendar period; and (3) the imposition of family caps, which specified 
that AFDC recipients would not receive higher benefits if they had additional children 
while on AFDC. 
Table 3 Comparison of the AFDC and TANF programs 
Item AFDC  TANF 
Financing  Matching grant  Block grant 
Eligibility  Children deprived of support of one 
parent or children in low-income 
two-parent families (AFDC-UP) 
Children in low-income families as 
designated by state; AFDC-UP 
abolished. Minor mothers must live 
with parents; minor mothers must also 
attend school 
Immigrants  Illegal aliens ineligible  Aliens ineligible for five years after 
entry and longer at state option 
Form of aid  Almost exclusively cash payment  States free to use funds for services 
and non-cash benefits 
Benefit levels  At state option  Same 
Entitlement status  Federal government required to pay 
matched share of all recipients 
 
No individual entitlement 
Income limits  Family income cannot exceed 
gross income limits 
No provision 
Asset limits  Federal limits  No provision 
Treatment of earnings 
disregards 
After 4 months of work, only a lump 
sum USD 90 deduction plus child 
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Item AFDC  TANF 
Time limits  None  Federal funds cannot be used for 
payments to adults for more than 60 
months lifetime (20 percent of 
caseload exempt) 
JOBS program  States must offer a program that 
meets federal law 
JOBS program abolished 
Work requirements  Parents without a child under 3 
required to participate in JOBS 
Exemptions from work requirements 
are narrowed and types of qualified 
activities are narrowed and 
prespecified (generally excludes 
education and classroom training) and 
must be 20 hours/week rising to 




JOBS participation requirements  Participation for work requirements rise 
to 50 percent by FY 2002 
Child care  Guaranteed for all JOBS 
participants 
No guarantee but states are given 
increased child care funds 
Sanctions General  provisions  Specific provisions mandating 
sanctions for failure to comply with 
work requirements, child support 
enforcement, schooling attendance, 
and other activities 
Child support  States required to allow first USD 
50 of child support received by 
mother to not reduce benefit 
No provision 
Note: “No Provision” means that the law had no requirement of the type (e.g., no income limits and no asset limits). 
Source: Burke (1996). 
 
Congress subsequently took action in 1996 by enacting the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which simultaneously reduced 
federal authority over the program but also mandated many (but not all) of the popular 
state-level waiver features. Table 3 summarizes the differences between AFDC and 
TANF. The PRWORA legislation converted the previous matching grant to a block 
grant and removed much of the federal regulatory authority over the design of the 
program. Thus states were free to set their benefit levels, as before, but also the tax rate, 
income limits, asset requirements, and even the form of assistance (cash or in-kind 
12  IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience services). The last provision is important because it allows states to use TANF dollars to 
support child care, job search support, social services, and other types of expenditure; 
there are no requirements on how much or little must be spent on cash aid directly. In 
addition, no federal definition of who is to be included in the assistance unit was 
imposed; the AFDC-UP program was abolished and states were able to cover two-
parent families at their discretion. In addition, and importantly, the entitlement nature of 
the program was abolished and states were not required to serve all eligibles. 
At the same time, however, the law imposed new federal authority in a few specified 
areas. Federal funds were not to be used to pay adults for more than 60 months of 
TANF benefits over their lifetimes, although states were allowed an exemption from 
this requirement for 20 percent of their caseloads. Minors who had dependent children 
were required to stay in school and live with their parents in order to receive federal 
TANF dollars. In addition, while the 1988 JOBS program was abolished, new work 
requirements were imposed that required that states enroll significantly greater fractions 
of the caseload in them (as many as 50 percent of single mother recipients and 90 
percent of two-parent families were to comply) and which narrowed the list of 
exemptions from the requirements. Recipients involved in general education and 
training could not be counted toward these participation requirements, as in many of the 
prior state reforms. The hours of work per week required were also greatly increased – 
up to 30 hours/week for single mothers and more for two-parent families.
2 
The most dramatic departures from the AFDC program were the time limit and work 
requirement provisions. Lifetime time limits were a new concept in US transfer 
programs and were based on a quite different philosophy of the aims of public 
assistance than had been the case theretofore. States were allowed certain types of 
exemptions from the time limits and were also allowed to grant temporary extensions to 
individual families, so long as the total number did not exceed 20 percent of the 
caseload. The work requirements in the new legislation were much stronger than in 
                                                 
2 The law imposed specific penalties on the states for not complying with these mandated provisions. These penalties 
took the form of percentage reductions in the block grant allocation for each type of violation. The work participation 
requirements were considerably ameliorated by another provision of the law which reduced those requirements in 
proportion to the amount of caseload reduction a state experienced. Because caseloads fell dramatically after the 
reform, the participation requirements were greatly reduced as well. 
IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience  13 previous law and changed the orientation from education and training to work per se. 
The law also allowed states to impose sanctions on recipients for failure to comply with 
the work requirements, sanctions which were much stronger than in past law and which 
were rigorously enforced. The work emphasis of the law was further reinforced by an 
increase in the funds made available for child care.
3  
After the 1996 legislation, states moved forward vigorously to design TANF 
programs along the lines indicated by the law and, in many cases, went beyond the 
minimum required. For example, many states imposed time limits shorter than the five 
year maximum required by the federal law. Other states imposed much stronger 
sanctions on recipients than required by the law. The states also embraced work 
requirements and sanctions vigorously. The most notable movement was toward a 
“Work First” approach in which recipients and new applicants for benefits were moved 
as quickly as possible into work of any kind, with a de-emphasis on education and 
training. Again, many states imposed strong sanctions for failure to comply with these 
requirements, usually beginning with an initial partial sanction at first noncompliance 
and then graduating to a more severe, full sanction at subsequent noncompliance. The 
work requirements were also often strengthened by frequent requirements for job search 
and work registration at the point of application for TANF benefits that must be 
complied with before benefit receipt could begin. In addition, the majority of states 
lowered their benefit-reduction rates, usually to approximately 50 percent. 
The PRWORA legislation represented more than simply a redirection of the 
employment goal and an increased emphasis on work. A new goal appeared which was 
to reduce “dependency,” a term much used in public discussions, which is more or less 
defined as long-term receipt of welfare benefits. Such dependency was presumed by the 
PRWORA legislation to have deleterious effects on adults and children, and its 
reduction became a goal in and of itself. Another new goal of welfare reform in the 
1990s was to reduce the rate of nonmarital childbearing and to encourage marriage. This 
                                                 
3 However, the guarantee of child care for working recipients which existed under AFDC was abolished. That 
guarantee was widely seen by states as a constraint on their ability to increase employment because it meant that 
states could not force women to work without first providing sufficient child care slots. 
14  IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience goal was explicitly stated in the preamble to the PRWORA legislation but the law itself 
had very few provisions directly relating to it.  
3  Effects of the reform 
3.1  Four types of studies 
There was a large effort by the research community to evaluate the effects of the 
welfare reform in the few years following 1996. This proved to be quite difficult 
because no evaluation plan was built into the legislation and its provisions were not 
tested prior to passage of the law (see Moffitt and Ver Ploeg 2001; and Blank 2002, for 
extensive discussions of the nature of the evaluation difficulties). A wide variety of 
evaluation methodologies were consequently used. Without going into a detailed 
discussion of those methodologies, suffice it to say that there were four basic types.
4 
First, analysts examined simple time trends in the outcomes of interest from before 
1996 to after 1996, to determine if a break in the trend occurred (e.g., Murray and 
Primus 2005). This method is complicated by the fact that other things may have been 
changing at the same time (e.g., the economy). Second, a variation on this method 
compared changes in outcomes over time for the groups most heavily affected by the 
reform – for example, less educated or low income single mothers – to those for groups 
not so affected by the reform but similar in some other respects – such as more educated 
or higher income single mothers, married women, or women without children (e.g., 
Ellwood 2000). This method requires that the outcomes for the different groups would 
have moved along the same trend-line in the absence of welfare reform, which is 
tantamount to saying that there could not have been other factors occurring which 
affected them differently. Third, many studies made use of the fact that different states 
enacted different programs prior to 1996 at different times, allowing a comparison of 
outcomes for women in different states as a measure of the effects of reform and 
allowing a control for the state of the local economy (e.g., Levine and Whitmore 1998). 
Relatedly, a few states implemented the PRWORA legislation later than others, 
                                                 
4 See Moffitt and Ver Ploeg (2001) for a detailed discussion. 
IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience  15 providing a short window for a comparison of outcomes during the period when some 
states had implemented the law and others had not. These methods are complicated by 
the fact that states differ in many other respects as well that are often difficult to control 
for and by the short windows of time allowed for the evaluation. Fourth, there were a 
series of randomized experiments in the US, all begun prior to 1996, which tested 
elements of the PRWORA legislation by a rigorous experimental-control methodology 
(e.g., Miller et al 2000). A drawback to this method is that the programs were not 
designed to replicate the features of PRWORA and hence differed from them 
significantly in most cases (e.g., most did not have time limits), and another limitation is 
that experiments, at least those tested on welfare recipients, will always miss “entry” 
effects (see below). 
Another pertinent set of issues related to whether the goal of assessing the effects of 
reform was to estimate the cumulative effect of all provisions of the law, equal to the 
combined effect of all components of the program together (work requirements, 
sanctions, time limits, etc.) – what may be termed the “overall” effect – or whether the 
goal was to assess the effects of each of the components separately, as if each had been 
introduced while the others had not. The evaluation methodologies just discussed are 
most effective for the first of these goals – examining the total, cumulative effect of all 
provisions and components. It has proven difficult to evaluate the effects of different 
components separately because, at least after 1996, all states implemented some form of 
the major components (work requirements, sanctions, time limits); thus no one of them 
was introduced while the others were not. Much of the knowledge of the effects of 
individual components arises from the period prior to 1996, when different states 
adopted different policies, but the problem with this type of analysis is that many of the 
policies were quite different than those later implemented in the TANF program. In 
principle, the fourth methodology – randomized experiments – could be used to assess 
the incremental effect of a given component holding the others fixed. Most of the 
evidence on the effects of individual components arises from experimental studies, as 
discussed below, but the experiments did not test many of the important components of 
the TANF legislation and did not always isolate the effects of others. 
16  IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience Finally, there are a number of issues concerning the outcomes of interest. A major set 
of outcomes of interest to policy-makers and the public relate to the effect of the reform 
on individual levels of employment and earnings, and on total family income and rates 
of poverty. Another set of outcomes of interest to some groups were the effects of the 
reform on child-bearing and marriage, while another set focuses on children – the 
effects on child development, behavior, educational levels, and so on (Waldfogel 2007). 
However, it should also be noted that many policy-makers regarded a reduction in the 
welfare caseload, and in welfare expenditures, as an outcome of interest in its own right. 
In this view, even if employment, earnings, income, and the other outcomes were 
unaffected by the law, it could still be regarded as successful if it reduced the caseload 
because “dependency” had been reduced. 
3.2  Findings on the overall effect of reform 
There have been a number of reviews of the research literature on the effects of 1990s 
welfare reform in the US (Blank 2002; Moffitt 2003; Grogger and Karoly 2005; Blank 
2007b). Here a relatively short summary of the findings will be provided. 
The simplest method of assessing the effects of the reform is by examining time-
series trends in the outcomes of interest. Figure 2 andFigure 3 show trends in AFDC-
TANF expenditures and caseloads, for example. These figures show a dramatic 
reduction in both over the relevant period, with the caseload dropping to levels in 2004 
below even those in the first year shown, 1970. This historically unprecedented decline 
is one of the strongest pieces of evidence in support of a welfare reform effect. Two 
complicating factors must be stated, however. One is that the unemployment rate (also 
shown in the figure) was falling at the same time and, indeed, it fell to historically low 
levels as well; this could have reduced the welfare caseload by itself. Further evidence 
on this issue will be mentioned below, but one piece of evidence suggesting that the 
unemployment rate per se was not the whole story is simply the fact that the 
unemployment rate rose in 2001 because of a recession beginning that year, returning to 
levels obtaining in the early 1990s and early 1970s, yet the welfare caseload remained 
low. The other complicating factor is that the decline in the caseload began somewhat 
prior to 1996. Most analysts believe that this was partly the result of the state-level 
welfare reforms that began in the early 1990s, but contributing factors could have been, 
IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience  17 again, the state of the economy but also concomitant expansions in the Earned Income 
Tax Credit. 






































































































Less than high school More than high school  
 
Figure 4 shows trends in the employment-to-population ratio, a common measure of 
labor force activity, and shows it for two different groups of women – single-mother 
families with less than a high school education and those with more than a high school 
education. This illustrates the second methodology mentioned above, inasmuch as 
women with more than a high school education should have been affected much less by 
the reform than those with lower levels of education. The figure shows that the 
employment-population ratio for the less-educated mothers (the lower line in the figure) 
started rising in 1993, about the time of the expansion of the EITC and the beginning of 
state-level welfare reform, then took a major, historically large jump after 1996. The 
employment rates for more educated mothers rose only slightly over the same period. 
This suggests that welfare reform had a significant positive impact on employment, and 
one that was not the result of the unemployment rate, which could be argued to have 
had similar effects on the two groups (although this could be called into question). It 
should be noted, however, that the employment rate fell a bit more after 1999 for the 
lesser educated mothers compared to those who were more educated, a sign either that 
18  IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience the gains from welfare reform were lost to some extent in the medium run, or that other 
forces were at work farther along in time. 

































































































Married Couple Family Single Mother Family  
 
Figure 5 shows trends in the poverty rate of two types of families, those headed by a 
married couple and those headed by a single mother. Once again, the latter group was 
affected much more by welfare reform than the former group. The figure shows a steep 
decline in the poverty rate of single mother families immediately after 1996 but only a 
slight decline in that of married couples. Further, while the poverty rates of both groups 
have risen since 2001, the poverty rate of single mother families has remained far below 
what it was prior to 1996. 
These simple figures provide strong prima facie evidence that the reform had effects 
on caseloads, program expenditures, employment (albeit possibly only in the short run), 
and poverty rates. However, this evidence needs to be backed up by more formal 
statistical analyses using these same methodologies in a more careful way, and by using 
the other methodologies discussed above. The reviews of the literature mentioned above 
have assessed that evidence. 
Table 4 shows a summary of the findings from these reviews. The statistical studies 
of the effect of welfare reform on caseloads and welfare use in general almost all show 
negative effects of reform. These studies control for the state of the economy and hence 
indicate that not the entire decline was a result of changing economic conditions (these 
studies were conducted prior to the recession of 2001+ as well). The central tendency of 
IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience  19 the findings suggests that caseloads were reduced by about 20 percent and employment 
was increased by about 4 percent as a result of welfare reform. The studies all show 
some contribution of the economy to the caseload decreases and employment increases 
as well, however, and many attempt to quantify the relative contributions of welfare 
reform and the economy to the decline in welfare use. The estimates range considerably 
but some assign at least half of the decline to the effects of an improved economy. Even 
if this is correct, it still implies a large effect of welfare reform.  
One of the interesting findings from these studies is that much of the decline in 
welfare use and caseloads arose because of decreased entry instead of increased exit 
(Acs et al 2003; Grogger et al 2003; Mueser et al 2000). Although it is unquestionable 
that welfare reform induced more women who were initially on welfare to leave, both 
because of increased government subsidies to work off welfare (e.g., from the Earned 
Income Tax Credit) or because of the “push” of welfare work requirements, sanctions, 
and time limits, it is also the case that many women who would ordinarily have gone 
onto welfare when faced with a decline in income or earnings – possibly a temporary 
one – instead stayed off welfare after the reform. It would not be surprising if this were 
a result, as well, of the increased work requirements, sanctions, and time limits on 
welfare, which would naturally be thought to make welfare less attractive. The EITC 
and a strong labor market would presumably also allow families to stay off welfare. The 
motivations of this group have been difficult to document with the available evidence, 
but this interpretation of the reduced entry effect is the one given by most analysts.  
20  IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience Table 4 Results of research on the overall effects of US welfare reform 
Outcome Findings 
Caseload  1.  Most studies show negative effects, both pre-1996 and post-1996, although the 
improved economy explains a significant portion of the caseload decline as well 
2.  A large fraction, if not the majority, of the effect arose from decreased entry to the 
program rather than increased exit 
3.  Those leaving welfare did so partly because of sanctions; those sanctioned were 
sometimes the more disadvantaged families rather than the more advantaged 
4.  Those leaving welfare often lost access to other benefits and services 
 
Employment  1.  Most studies show positive net effects on employment rates 
2.  Women who left welfare had employment rates of approximately 60-70 percent 
3.  Employment rates of women on welfare rose from <10 percent to over 30 percent 
4.  Those who were not employed often had income from others in the family or from 
other transfer programs 
5.  A high fraction worked full time as well as part time 
 
Earnings  1.  Most studies show positive net effects on earnings 
2.  Women who left welfare also showed increased earnings from others in the 
household 
3.  Hourly wage rates are above the official minimum wage 
4.  Mixed evidence on whether wages grow with experience after leaving welfare 
 
Family income and 
poverty 
1.  Most studies show increases in average family income and declines in poverty 
rates 
2.  Women who left welfare had, on average, only small increases in income and 
declines in poverty; those who did not enter welfare experienced strong increases 
in income and declines in poverty 
3.  The incomes of women who left welfare rose little because the loss of benefits 
almost cancelled out the increase in earnings and increase in other household 
members’ income 
4.  Some early studies showed a decline in income and increase in poverty among 




Most studies show no discernible effect 
 
Source:  Blank (2002), Moffitt (2003), Grogger and Karoly (2005). 
 
Another issue of interest is the extent to which those women who left welfare did so 
because of the stronger sanction policy. This is quite difficult to determine because 
some women leave welfare in anticipation of being sanctioned and therefore never 
actually experience a sanction; therefore, the number of women actually sanctioned is 
an underestimate of the number affected. For example, many of the women who left 
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eligibility redetermination meetings, or just not replying to letters and requests for 
information, meetings, or documentation. If some fraction of these recipients knew that 
sanctions would be imposed if they did not comply and decided simply to go off welfare 
in anticipation, this would be somewhat difficult to measure. Nevertheless, cross-state 
comparisons of states with differing strengths of sanction policies show that stronger 
sanctions result in lower welfare usage and caseloads (Levine and Whitmore 1998). 
What is more easily measured is how many of the women who left welfare had, in 
fact, actually been sanctioned. Here the figures indicate that a large fraction were, 
possibly 10 or 20 percent. Indeed, sanctions were often imposed, even though some 
were “partial” sanctions and did not result in welfare termination: nationwide, about 5 
percent of TANF recipients were sanctioned every month in the few years after the 
legislation. 
The evidence on who was sanctioned and who was not is not solid, but several 
studies show, surprisingly, that sanctions were not always imposed on the more “job-
ready” individuals (Pavetti et al 2003). If those who have the greatest labor market 
opportunities off welfare – the greatest levels of education, the greatest levels of past 
work experience, and so on – end up being sanctioned because they appear to be 
capable of work but refuse to do so, the framers of the legislation would see that as 
fulfilling the purpose of the sanctions. But if some of those sanctioned were the least 
job-ready and were drawn from the more disadvantaged portion of the caseload, policy-
makers would be concerned. In this case, it is possible that families who are in turmoil 
or who cannot organize their lives sufficiently to comply with the rules are the same 
ones who are forced off welfare, and are likely to be worse off as a result. 
The findings on employment and earnings reported in Table 4 confirm the time-
series evidence presented earlier, indicating consistently positive effects of welfare 
reform. About two-thirds of women who left welfare were employed in the immediate 
period following reform, and many more were employed at some point over a longer 
period of one or two years (Acs and Loprest 2004). This was one of the most surprising 
results of welfare reform, for historical employment rates of women on welfare had 
never exceeded 10 or 15 percent at most, and were usually less than 10 percent. The 
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portion of recipients (the more job-ready) were capable of working at these levels, was a 
major surprise and resulted in a fundamental change in policy-makers’ views of the 
work ability of women on welfare.  
A high fraction of those who left worked full time (defined as 35 hours per week or 
more), and hourly wage rates of those who worked were reasonably high (Acs and 
Loprest 2004). Earnings increased for women who left welfare, although this is to be 
expected if employment increased to 60-70 percent relative to 10 percent or less when 
on welfare. Another outcome of interest is whether there were increased earnings from 
individuals in the household other than the welfare recipient herself – for example, older 
children, spouses or cohabitors, or other relatives. The evidence has indicated 
considerably greater increases in this form of earnings than expected (Bavier 2001). The 
general interpretation is that families that went off welfare increased employment from 
many family members in order to sustain their family incomes. 
Another issue of interest is whether welfare reform affects wage growth. 
Conventional wisdom is that the age-earnings profiles of low-skilled workers are 
particularly flat, perhaps because the types of jobs that low-skilled workers hold have 
little human capital and training content that would lead to increased earnings. This 
would suggest that former welfare recipients would also have slow wage growth after 
leaving welfare, and a number of studies support this suggestion (Moffitt and 
Rangarajan 1989; Burtless 1995; Card et al 2001). This has generated a source of 
considerable policy concern because the more hoped-for outcome is that former 
recipients would gain experience in the labor market, leading to increased wages which 
would reduce the probability of coming back onto welfare in the future. However, the 
evidence is completely mixed on this issue, with a significant number of high-quality 
studies also showing that the returns to work experience are just as high among low-
skilled workers and single mothers than among other types of workers (Gladden and 
Taber 2000; Grogger 2005; Connolly and Gottschalk 2006). 
The evidence on the effects of welfare reform on total family income, and on poverty 
rates, is also very important. The general findings from the statistical studies support the 
poverty rate time trends mentioned earlier, showing that incomes of disadvantaged 
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groups, in the years following welfare reform (Blank 2002; Grogger and Karoly 2005). 
However, the studies have indicated that the large majority of these income gains 
occurred among women who did not enter welfare rather than among those who left 
welfare after reform. To some extent, this is not surprising because women initially off 
welfare have greater job skills and should have been better able to take advantage of the 
heightened job opportunities in the labor market. However, it does imply that the gains 
from welfare reform were not evenly spread, having their largest effects on those low-
income families who already had some job skills rather than on the most disadvantaged. 
In addition, the fact that family incomes of those women who left welfare rose only 
modestly (on the order of 10 percent or so) indicates that the loss of welfare benefits 
prevented their incomes from rising very much. Indeed, most studies indicated that the 
increased earnings that women obtained after leaving welfare were either equal to the 
welfare benefits lost or a bit below it. The reason that family incomes rose modestly is 
because other family members increased their earnings and because the families were 
able to secure more benefits from welfare programs other than TANF. It is consequently 
unclear whether welfare reform worked because it “made work pay.” If “making work 
pay” means ensuring that earnings of a woman are greater off welfare than her welfare 
benefits on welfare, the evidence does not indicate a very strong effect of that kind, if 
any. 
It should be emphasized that these results are based on averages of all women 
leaving welfare, not just those who were employed. The fact that 60-70 percent of 
former welfare recipients worked after leaving welfare necessarily implies that 30-40 
percent did not.
5 The latter group typically experienced a reduction in family income 
and, obviously, did not have earnings greater than their welfare benefits. Their 
reductions in income were lessened by increased other-family-member earnings and 
increased benefits from other programs, but these did not offset the loss of welfare 
benefits. For the former group, however – those who were employed after leaving 
welfare – earnings were generally somewhat greater than the welfare benefits lost, 
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earnings. Thus, it may be that “work pays” if work can in fact be achieved, but that does 
not necessarily mean that going off welfare pays, in general. 
Another piece of information relevant to changes in family income subsequent to 
welfare reform is how take-up rates of those eligible for TANF on a financial basis 
changed. If the reduction in the caseload was primarily a result of increased earnings 
and family income that lifted families above the income-eligibility cutoffs for TANF, 
that is different than reductions in the caseload arising from decreases in the fraction of 
families who receive TANF despite being financially eligible. In fact, a large part of the 
reduction in the caseload was a result of the latter effect. Participation rates among 
financial eligibles dropped from around 80 percent in the early 1990s to 69 percent in 
1997, and further dropped to 42 percent by 2004 (US Department of Health and Human 
Services 2007, Table 4a). These reductions were no doubt a result of families who were 
sanctioned off welfare as well as eligible families who choose not to apply for the 
program because of the new work requirements, or attempted to apply and were rejected 
because of failure to meet those requirements. 
Another set of findings in the research literature examined the distribution of income 
among low-income single-mother families and not just the average. Some of these 
studies have indicated that the family incomes of those in the bottom of the distribution 
(e.g., the lowest one-fifth or the lowest tenth) experienced declining incomes after 
welfare reform, and that the increase in average income and reduction in average 
poverty rates arose only because the majority of the distribution was better off (or, for 
the case of poverty rates, because those with incomes just below the poverty line were 
the primary gainers). An analysis of one experimental trial of a program that combined 
time limits with increased financial incentives yielded consistent findings, showing that 
welfare reform had no effect, if not a negative one, at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution but a positive effect in the middle of the distribution (but no effect at the 
upper portion as well) (Bitler et al 2006). This evidence is still being debated because 
direct information on consumption shows no such decline in the lower tail of the 
                                                                                                                                               
 
5 Blank (2007a) estimates that 20-25 percent of all low income single mothers – whether former welfare recipients 
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Sullivan 2007). 
Some attention in the research on former welfare recipients examined which other 
government programs they availed themselves of after leaving welfare. Data on this 
question are available only for selected states, but indicate a rather sparse set of other 
government benefits were received (Acs and Loprest 2004, Table 6.2). The most 
commonly received form of benefit was Food Stamps, which was received by 33-74 
percent of former recipient families. However, almost 100 percent of families received 
Food Stamps prior to leaving welfare because such benefits were automatically granted 
to AFDC recipients, so there was a significant reduction in receipt after leaving 
welfare.
6 Between 7 and 20 percent of families received Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) benefits, which are made available to families with aged, blind, or disabled adults 
and children. Between 4 and 8 percent received some form of Social Security income, 
often from the Social Security Disability Insurance program. Virtually none of the 
families received Unemployment Insurance benefits because the US system requires a 
significant employment and earnings history to qualify, and almost no low-income 
single mothers have sufficient qualifications. 
Finally, the evidence on the effects of welfare reform on family structure and 
marriage indicates weak effects, if any. The proponents of the 1996 legislation hoped 
that nonmarital fertility would fall and that marriage rates would rise as a result of the 
reform, for rising rates of nonmarital births and falling marriage rates have been a 
source of considerable policy concern. In principle, a welfare program which provides 
benefits to low-income families which are a positive function of the number of children 
provide an incentive for increased fertility, and a program which favors single-mother 
families over two-parent families should decrease marriage. Consequently, a reduction 
in the generosity of such a program should reduce fertility and increase marriage. 
However, the 1996 welfare reform had few provisions directly aimed at fertility and 
marriage, the main exception being optional state provisions for family caps mentioned 
                                                                                                                                               
are not – are neither on welfare or working, and have low incomes and high poverty rates. 
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work to decrease marriage, inasmuch as it allows women to be more economically 
independent. In any case, the results from the three surveys mentioned above show, 
overwhelmingly, either insignificant effects of welfare reform overall or of individual 
components on either fertility and marriage, with rare exceptions (see Schoeni and 
Blank 2000, for an illustrative study), and even the specific studies of the effects of 
family caps show weak effects at best from the highest-quality studies. On the basis of 
these findings, it is generally agreed that if the government is to alter fertility and 
marriage patterns among the poor, some other types of policies will be necessary. 
3.3  Findings on effect of components 
The results summarized thus far pertain to the overall effect of welfare reform and not 
to the effects of specific components such as work requirements, sanctions, or time 
limits. As suggested earlier, it has been very difficult for analysts to separate the effects 
of each of these components from the others, given their simultaneous occurrence. 
Blank (2002, pp. 1137-38) notes that disentangling the effects of individual components 
in econometric studies face two problems, namely, that a full set of components is not 
always represented in the models and there is often insufficient cross-state variation in 
components to reliably estimate an effect. Blank concludes that “It is difficult to draw 
strong conclusions about the impact of specific policies from this literature” (pp. 1138). 
On the other hand, a large number of randomized experiments have been conducted in 
the US as well, many of which can be viewed as providing stronger evidence on the 
effects of components of welfare reform because they had fewer elements in the 
treatment. However, even the best of the experiments always bundled a number of 
different features into their treatments, also making it often difficult to draw conclusions 
about effects of the individual policies that were actually implemented by the states in 
their TANF programs. 
From econometric studies, there is some evidence on at least two policy components, 
sanctions and time limits. There have been a few studies of the effects of sanctions, 
                                                                                                                                               
 
6 In the general population of all families, participation rates of families who were eligible for the Food Stamp 
program fell from 70 percent in 1994 to 48 percent in 2000, although they rose back to 55 percent by 2004 (US 
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There have been more econometric studies of time limits, which have been shown to 
have a negative effect on the caseload and positive effect on employment rates (Grogger 
and Michalopoulos 2003; Grogger 2004; and Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001). The studies 
by Grogger and Michalopoulos, and by Grogger, provide estimates specifically for 
women with young children, finding that the effects on welfare use for that group are 
particularly strongly negative. These findings seem plausible and sensible even if their 
basis is not as strong as that for the overall effects. 
There is more extensive evidence on individual policy components from randomized 
experiments. While none of the experiments tested the effects of sanctions in isolation, 
two experiments tested the effects of time limits, although in both cases bundled with a 
decrease in the benefit-reduction rate on earnings (Bloom et al 2000, 2002). The results 
indicated that time limits increased rates of welfare participation rates prior to the time 
limit but lowered them in the longer run, but the former result was probably the result of 
the decrease in the benefit-reduction rate. However, while the programs also increased 
employment, they had no significant effects on income because the gain in earnings and 
other forms of income arising from going off welfare were cancelled out by the loss in 
welfare benefits.  
A larger number of experiments tested the effects of work requirements (also called 
“mandatory employment programs”) or financial incentives (i.e., reductions in marginal 
tax rates or increases in earnings subsidy rates), or, sometimes, both combined. 
Experiments which imposed work requirements – backed up by sanctions – but without 
financial incentives showed reductions in welfare usage ranging from 3 percent to 12 
percent, increases in employment rates ranging from essentially zero to 15 percent, but 
no effects on family income (see Tables 5.1, 6.1, and 7.1 in Grogger and Karoly 2005, 
for the results from 13 experiments of this type and Bloom and Michaelopoulos 2001, 
for a discussion of 11 experiments). Once again, the lack of effects on family income 
was a result of an equal sized increase in earnings and reduction in welfare benefits. 
There were also a much smaller number of experiments which tested financial 
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bundled into the treatments – the most well-known of which was the Minnesota Family 
Investment Program (Miller et al 2000). The “MFIP” program increased welfare usage 
by about 10 percent, had very little effect on employment rates, but increased family 
income. The positive effects on welfare usage rates arose because negative-income-tax 
decreases in a marginal tax rate always keep more families on welfare by allowing them 
to work at higher hours and earnings levels than before, and the small effects on 
employment arose because such a program always raises the breakeven level of 
earnings (that is, the maximum level of earnings at which benefits can be received) and 
hence reduce employment relative to families who leave welfare altogether. The 
positive effects on family income arise because higher benefits are paid to everyone – 
there is no benefit reduction for any family, in contrast to work requirement programs. 
A few experiments tested combined work requirements with financial incentives, the 
most well-known again being the MFIP program, one variant of which required 
recipients to work (Miller et al 2000). Like the first MFIP program discussed above, 
this program increased welfare usage and family income but had significant positive 
effects on employment. This result shows that financial incentives can be helpful in 
increasing employment even when work requirements are the major policy reform; the 
“pull” of financial rewards is an important supplement to the “push” of mandatory 
work. 
There were also two well-known experimental trials of financial incentives in the 
form of earnings subsidies, both of which paid low-income families additional funds if 
they worked a minimum 30 hours per week. The SSP program (Michalopoulos et al 
2002) and the New Hope program (Bos et al 1999) did not have mandatory work 
requirements, and were both operated outside the regular welfare system, so that those 
who received payments were regarded as ‘not on welfare.’ The results of the 
experiments showed negative effects on welfare usage, positive effects on employment, 
and positive effects on family income, thus yielding favorable results on all three 
outcomes.
7 Further, the magnitudes of the effects were far larger than the other work 
                                                 
7 The New Hope results differed somewhat for those who chose to work 30 hours or more. See the references. 
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somewhat misleading. The negative effects on welfare usage arose only because 
“welfare” was defined as the regular program, even though the families that took up the 
earnings subsidies were receiving government payments and should, by any usual term, 
be regarded as welfare recipients. Further, the primary reason the magnitudes of the 
effects were larger than in the other programs was that the payments were extremely 
generous, far largerthan in any TANF program in any state in the US. Benefits of the 
size tested in these programs are probably beyond the budgetary capability of the 
governments in the US. 
Understanding these results requires making distinctions between decreases in the 
benefit-reduction rate, of the type associated with a negative income tax, and earnings 
subsidies, assuming both are unrestricted (that is, without minimum hours 
requirements). Unrestricted reductions in the benefit-reduction rate, which is what most 
US states have implemented after welfare reform, generate subsidies which decrease 
with earnings and therefore are generally believed to have their major positive effect on 
work at the bottom of the earnings distribution; higher up in the earnings distribution, 
benefit supplements are quite small. Unrestricted earnings subsidies, on the other hand, 
increase with earnings and therefore have more effects higher up the earnings 
distribution (although they must eventually be phased out as well, leading to negative-
income-tax effects where the subsidy must decline with earnings); in fact, the amount of 
the subsidy for very low earnings families can be quite small. But if one compares a 
negative income rate benefit-rate reduction to earnings subsidies with minimum hours 
restrictions of, say, 30 hours/per week, there is much less difference between the two if 
they pay the same benefit at the 30 hours point, for the only difference between them is 
in the shape of the subsidy above that hours point. The major effect of a hours-restricted 
subsidy of either type is on the choice to work or not to work 30 hours.
8 
Another component issue that has been examined by the randomized experiments is 
whether work-requirements that attempt to move welfare recipients into employment as 
quickly as possible (so-called “Work First” or “rapid employment” programs, see, e.g., 
30  IFAU – Welfare reform: the US experience Danziger and Seefeldt 2000) have greater or smaller effects than programs which 
attempt some form of human-capital investment through increased education or training 
rather than immediate employment. The evidence in the studies that have been 
conducted on this question indicates that the human-capital investment approach does 
not dominate and, in fact, is often inferior to the Work First approach (Bloom and 
Michaelopoulos 2001). Rapid-employment programs increase employment and reduce 
welfare usage quickly, whereas human-capital development programs, which cost much 
more, have no greater employment effects three years after the initiation of the reform. 
However, Hotz et al (2006) argue that greater employment gains from the human capital 
approach appear if a longer-term follow-up is conducted. In any case, Bloom and 
Michaelopoulos argue that the best approach is neither rapid-employment nor human 
capital for everyone, but rather a more nuanced approach which separates the caseload 
according to their needs, requiring rapid-employment for those with significant 
preexisting job skills and a human-capital strategy for those with greater needs for skill 
improvement. 
4  Remaining and future issues in the US 
There are many remaining and future issues currently under discussion in the US, 
although most have to do with fine-tuning and modifications in the current reform rather 
than wholesale change. That the 1996 welfare reform was a success, in overall terms 
and on average, is almost universally accepted by policy analysts and researchers. 
One set of general issues revolves around whom the TANF program is intended to 
serve and who it is not intended to serve, and the related issue of work requirements on 
TANF. The evidence presented in the previous section suggests that the large majority 
of the increased employment and earnings that resulted from welfare reform occurred 
by women either leaving, or not coming onto, welfare, and not from increased work 
among those remaining on welfare. While the latter has risen as well, it has not been the 
major source of the effect. Whether work should be substantially increased among 
                                                                                                                                               
8 A related issue with minimum-hours restricted programs is whether some subsidy should also be provided to 
women who only can, or are willing, to work part-time. These programs provide no work incentives for that group. 
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as predominantly composed of women who have great difficulties with working 
because of a variety of health, education, and family problems, has not been resolved in 
any clear way. While the success of the reform could suggest that it should be carried 
even further and deeper into the caseload, it may also be the case that the most job-
ready women have already left welfare and that the majority of the remaining caseload 
have problems that should be addressed by other services than simple work 
requirements. 
While this issue relates to how to serve the population of women remaining on 
welfare, other issues relate to women who have left welfare or who have chosen not to 
come onto welfare. As noted above, about 40 percent of former welfare recipients are 
not working and about 20 percent of all low income single mothers are not working and 
not on welfare, and this group has low income and high poverty rates. In addition, even 
those who are working have low earnings and hourly wage rates and are often 
struggling to maintain steady employment and earnings. There is widespread sentiment 
that increased assistance of two types is needed for these families. One is increased 
work supports in the form of better child care and increased assistance in finding jobs, 
for example. There is also some sentiment that increased earnings of the workers in this 
group would benefit from a return to some type of human-capital strategy that would 
help their earnings to grow over time, thereby reducing their long-term need for 
assistance. Efforts to stabilize employment among welfare-leavers by assisting them to 
stay on their current jobs or to leave only for better jobs are also underway. A second 
type of assistance is increased support of non-employment-related services to address 
the needs of this population in regards to health, substance abuse, and family and child 
problems. Because families who have left welfare are often outside the government 
transfer-program system, the government has difficulty identifying those with problems 
and with delivering services to those most in need. Blank (2007a) has proposed that 
states set up new programs which are designed specifically for those who have special 
difficulties with finding employment and that a variety of both employment-related and 
non-employment-related services be provided for such families. 
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employment or non-employment-related problems goes to the heart of the 1996 welfare 
reform. That reform could be viewed as having removed the “safety net” for most 
families by no longer guaranteeing them financial support should their incomes fall 
below stipulated levels. While the removal of this safety net appears to have had 
positive effects on many single mothers by inducing them to work and providing 
support to their families without the help of welfare, some have not been so successful 
and are in need of continued assistance. Because they are off welfare, however, 
providing this assistance is difficult. 
It should be noted that an issue which is no longer debated in the US is whether work 
programs and work requirements should be mandatory or voluntary. The consensus is 
that they must be mandatory, and that voluntary programs have much smaller positive 
effects. While a strong labor market, strong wage growth in the economy, and earnings 
supplements for low-skilled workers off welfare are very important in encouraging 
individuals to leave welfare or to stay off in the first place, they are by themselves 
insufficient to make a major impact on the welfare caseload. Mandatory work programs, 
which force women to take actions to change their situation, are necessary. 
An issue which is still remaining is the effect of time limits. Evidence to date 
suggests that approximately twenty-five thousand families hit a time limit by early 
2002, approximately five years after welfare reform, and since then about 3,000 families 
have hit their limits each year (Farrell and Rich 2007). These are relatively small 
numbers compared to the size of the caseload, at least since 2002. As a consequence, 
most analysts believe that time limits have had much less effect than anticipated 
(although it should be reemphasized that many more women may have left welfare in 
anticipation of hitting the limit). Indeed, there is little policy discussion of reforms in 
time limits at the present time. In part, the small number of terminated cases arose 
because so many women left welfare and hence stopped accumulating years of welfare 
on their record. In addition, states often made use of their exemptions to allow some 
fraction of those who hit the time limit to continue on. A few other states picked up the 
cost of women hitting the time limit with state funds, thus essentially removing the time 
limit (sometimes doing so only for the children).  
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services made available to unskilled prime age males, both married and unmarried. 
Most transfer programs exclude them, with the exception of the EITC for those with 
dependents, and Food Stamps is a major exception that provides universal support. But 
Medicaid, SSI, housing, and child care are not well targeted on this group, and TANF 
provides little support to low income married men. Training programs, while important, 
are too small in scale to make much of a difference. This is a group which many believe 
is largely neglected by the current system, yet which has major employment problems 
which are not being adequately addressed. 
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* 
Much of what we know regarding the impact of welfare reforms on economic behavior 
comes from the US. There are at least three reasons for that. First, the US experience 
has been characterized by early and extensive social security reforms. Second, variation 
in social security arrangements – and in the timing of social security reforms – across 
otherwise similar states has to some extent facilitated identification of the causal 
impacts of institutional features and reforms. And third, in the US, there has been a 
scientific culture for genuine experiments based on random assignment. 
Examining the impact of reforms and experiments may be interesting in its own right 
– and policy makers may learn directly from the successes as well as the failures of 
initiatives taken in other countries. In addition, reforms and experiments may contribute 
to the identification of the impact of deeper structural parameters on economic behavior 
and thus, facilitate the evaluation of policies that have never really been attempted in 
practice. However, there are also some grounds for caution. The impact of particular 
institutional features and reforms may heavily depend on the broader institutional 
context in which they are planted. Hence, research findings of this kind are not always 
easily transferable across time and space. 
Robert Moffitt’s article summarizes the impressive volume of research-based 
evidence that has accumulated in relation to reforms of the cash-based welfare program 
for single mothers. A particularly far-reaching reform was implemented in 1996, when 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) was passed, 
replacing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF). The reform imposed credible work-requirements, backed 
up by sanctions, and established time limits on lifetime receipts. There was an increase 
in the funding of childcare. In many states, work-incentives were also improved by 
lowering the benefit-reduction rates. The key message coming out of the evaluation 
literature is that this radical reform was a success; it reduced the program caseload and 
government expenditures, it increased employment propensity and earnings, and it 
reduced poverty rates. However, there is also some empirical evidence indicating that 
 
* Knut Røed is a Senior Researcher at Frisch Centre, Oslo University. families at the very bottom of the income distribution were made worse off by the 
reform. 
But how sure can we be regarding the actual impacts of the reform and the 
interpretation of those impacts? The cash-based welfare program for single mothers 
happened to be reformed in a very fortunate business cycle environment, and the 
program caseload was declining even before the implementation of the reform. Cyclical 
fluctuations clearly have independent effects on all outcomes of interest; hence it is 
difficult to separate the reform effects from the business cycle effects. Moffitt explains 
how different researchers have approached this problem, e.g., by exploiting small 
variations across states in the timing of implementation and by using individuals who 
were unaffected by the reform (e.g., married women) as “controls”. The bottom line is 
that although cyclical fluctuations were indeed responsible for some of the 
improvements in outcomes that were observed after the 1996 reform, they cannot 
explain the entire shift in the outcome distribution. With respect to caseload, the sheer 
magnitude of the decline after 1996 – together with its failure to rise again as cyclical 
conditions deteriorated after 2000 – provides compelling evidence in favor of a 
significant reform effect. However, for the other success criteria, such as employment 
and earnings, the evidence is perhaps slightly less conclusive. Although assumptions 
that cyclical conditions had similar effects on employment rates for “treatments” and 
“controls” may seem reasonable, they can hardly be backed up by undisputed empirical 
evidence. Moreover, work incentives for low-wage earners improved significantly 
during the 1990’s as a result of other institutional changes as well, such as the increases 
in minimum wages and the expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
Cyclical fluctuations also interfere with evaluation studies in a more subtle way: 
They  affect the effects of welfare reform. Indeed, it seems plausible that work-
requirements have more clout when jobs are plentiful than when they are scarce. In the 
words of Blank (2003), “it’s very useful to have a strong macroeconomy if you want to 
implement work-oriented welfare reform”. This implies that even if it is possible to 
verify a reform-impact over and beyond what can be attributed to cyclical conditions 
and other structural changes, it is not necessarily the case that a similar effect would 
have been obtained under alternative cyclical circumstances. Therefore, one needs to be 
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the identified causal effects may not carry over to other economic environments. It is of 
course also politically easier to implement radical welfare reforms when job availability 
is not a big issue. 
A particular concern that arises when partial welfare reforms are implemented in a 
European “welfare state” context is that of benefit substitution. Welfare states are 
characterized by multiple layers in their social security safety nets, and tightening the 
rules in one part of the system may simply pass the costs on to other parts. This is 
sometimes referred to as the “squeezed sausage effect”, and may be particularly relevant 
with respect to the impact of sanctions and time limits, since the possibility of shifting 
to another type of benefit undermines the “threat-effect” of these measures. The 
findings reported by Moffitt indicate that this is not a major concern in the US context 
(although data on benefit claims from other government programs are only available for 
selected states). It may be more important for the extent to which similar reforms are 
implemented in Europe. The phenomenon of benefit substitution also implies that 
developments in the caseload or expenditures of a given program may not be the 
appropriate success indicator to look at; what we really would like to measure is the 
overall rate of welfare dependency, not its composition in terms of different programs. 
In order to assess the generality of the lessons from the US reform, we do not only 
need to examine its overall quantitative impacts, we also need to understand which 
aspects of the reform that actually delivered the results. Moffitt discusses the attempts 
that have been made by the research community to identify the roles played by the 
different reform elements, i.e., work-requirement, improved work incentives, sanctions 
and time limits. A number of randomized experiments actually turn out to shed some 
light on this issue. The results are not crystal-clear, however. For example, experiments 
imposing work requirements – backed up by sanctions, but without improvements in 
work incentives – have shown increases in employment rates ranging from zero to 15 
percent. A more unanimous finding, however, seems to be that family income is more 
or less unaffected by such reforms, implying that any earnings gains that might occur 
are typically offset by welfare benefit cuts. A few experiments have also tested the 
combination of work requirements and improved financial incentives. These 
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Moffitt’s words) that “the ‘pull’ of financial rewards is an important supplement to the 
‘push’ of mandatory work”. Access to child care is clearly also crucial for mobilizing 
the labor supply of lone parents. And child care dollars available to low-income families 
in the US increased sharply during the 1990’s. 
A particularly interesting feature of the US experience is that a relatively large 
fraction of the caseload effect came through reduced entry rather than increased exit. As 
pointed out by Moffitt, it seems plausible that the decline in entry somehow resulted 
from the lower attractiveness of welfare caused by increased work-requirements, 
sanctions and time limits. However, virtually all experimental studies that have been 
carried out in the US have exclusively focused on families receiving or applying for 
welfare; hence, there is little robust evidence regarding the empirical relevance of the 
various reform-components with respect to the entry effect. Given the apparent 
magnitude of entry-responses, Grogger et al (2003, p. 291) argue that there is “an 
imbalance in the nation’s research agenda” at this point. 
One of the major concerns regarding the introduction of TANF was its consequences 
for individuals hitting the time limit. Little evidence has so far been offered on this 
issue, partly because relatively few individuals have exhausted their entitlements. 
According to the regulations, federal funds cannot pay adults more than 5 years of 
TANF benefits over their lifetimes. However, states were allowed an exemption from 
this requirement for 20 percent of their caseloads. And some states also used state funds 
to pick up the cost of supporting women hitting the time limit, essentially removing the 
limit completely. Even though relatively few individuals actually hit the time limit, it 
cannot be ruled out that the time limit accounts for an essential part of the overall 
impacts of the reform; see, e.g., Grogger (2004). Its existence may have affected the 
claimants’ behavior early on in their benefit spells. While a flexible exemption practice 
may imply that the most adverse consequences of the reform – in terms of increased 
poverty – are avoided, it may also undermine the viability of the reform’s apparent 
success, since it makes the “threat” embedded in the time limit less credible.  
A key lesson for Scandinavian countries is probably that push and pull forces seem 
to reinforce each other, and that the current macroeconomic situation is almost ideal for 
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typical welfare state economies may be limited, however. A general reduction in the 
welfare benefit level is typically not considered desirable, since it could work against 
the aim of poverty prevention among individuals who face serious external employment 
barriers. And making low-wage work pay significantly more is typically considered too 
expensive from a fiscal point of view. Given the relatively compressed wage 
distribution prevailing in Scandinavian countries – with high wage floors, rigid relative 
wages, and relatively strong employment protection for “insiders” – lack of work 
incentives may after all not be the most important barrier towards re-integrating welfare 
recipients into the labor market. An even more serious problem may be that it is too 
costly or too risky for employers to employ them.  Hence, the Scandinavian welfare 
reform must address the issue of employability and combine activity requirements with 
policies aimed at improving the firms’ incentives to hire “marginal” low-wage workers; 
e.g., through wage subsidies or educational programs. 
It is perhaps typical for the Scandinavian approach that when Norway implemented 
its big reform of the welfare support system for single mothers in 1998, activity-
oriented measures – such as work or education requirements and time limits – were 
balanced by a rise in the benefit level. The reform nevertheless worked; earnings rose 
(along with benefits) and poverty rates fell (Mogstad and Pronzato, 2007). It is also 
interesting to note that while the employment impacts of the reform were strongest in 
regions with low unemployment, the education impacts were strongest in regions with 
high unemployment. Hence, the impacts of general activity requirements – in terms of 
getting people off welfare – may be more stable over the business cycle than pure work 
requirements.  
Activity requirements in various forms (work, education, program participation) as 
well as time limits are high on the political agenda in the Scandinavian countries. And 
recent empirical evidence suggests that they have the intended effect of increasing 
ordinary employment, even when the time constraints are “soft” (with generous 
exemption rules and/or follow-on benefits) and the sanctions associated with non-
compliance are “mild” (e.g., in the form of a few weeks benefit termination); see Røed 
and Westlie (2007). This suggests that many of the desired effects of work-oriented 
44  IFAU – Comment by Knut Røed reforms can be obtained without the side-effect of increased poverty among individuals 
with insurmountable employment barriers.  
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